The article below is found in:
Antony,
Wayne and Les Samuelson, (eds.),
1998 Power and Resistance: Critical Thinking About
Canadian Social Issues, pp. 95-114,
Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
From
Solution to Problem:
Multiculturalism
and "Race Relations" as New Social Problems
Nikolaos
Liodakis and Vic Satzewich
In 1837 and 1838 radicals in Upper and Lower Canada organized a series of
rebellions against British rule. The
rebel demands included more freedom from British decision-making and a modicum
of self government. They were
quickly put down by the British troops stationed in Toronto and Quebec City, but
some of the leaders escaped to the United States where they tried to solicit
American support for their cause.
Shortly after defeating the rebels, the British government sent the
highly regarded statesman, the Earl of Durham, to investigate and report on the
situation in the Canadas. Not
surprisingly, the rebels' aspirations for self-government were regarded by
Durham as both misplaced and unnecessary. He
argued that the problem that led to the rebellions was not Britain's control
over decision-making, but rather the relatively unique "racial"
dynamics in the colonies. Durham
told the British House of Commons that "I could not ... believe that this
animosity was only that subsisting between an official oligarchy and a people;
and again, I was brought to a conviction that the contest, which had been
represented as a contest of classes, was, in fact a contest of races"
(Durham, 1902, our emphasis). The
"races" in this case, were the British and the French, and the contest
between the decidedly superior "British race" and the "hopelessly
inferior" French Canadian "race". Part of Durham's proposed solution to this "contest of
races" was to unite the two colonies into a single political entity, and to
aggressively amalgamate the racially inferior French Canadians into the British
population.
Durham's Report to the British House of Commons is interesting for a
number of reasons, not least of which is that like many after him, he
interpreted the so-called Canadian problem in terms of the language of
"race" and regarded assimilation as the solution to the problem of
diversity.[i]
Over one hundred and fifty years later, the Canadian problem is still
understood by many people in terms of ethnic and "racial" diversity.
While the skin colours, countries of origin and identities of the
contestants have changed to a certain extent, for many people the main challenge
that Canada continues to face is how to maintain a cohesive society in the face
of our ethnic and "racial" diversity.
Speaking about new immigrants to Canada, for example, the 1986 Royal
Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada noted that
it seems likely that in future
years, a substantial proportion of newcomers will be attracted from non-European
nations, and these new Canadians will continue to expand our cultural and ethnic
mix. These important changes in
Canada's racial and ethnic composition will continue to transform our economic
and political life in the coming decades. They
are also likely to generate a certain amount of social conflict, and future
generations of Canadians will need to invent new policies and techniques for
coping with the stresses of a vibrant and dynamic multicultural society (Royal
Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 1986).
For the Royal Commissioners' the ethnic and "racial" diversity
of Canada is both a problem and an opportunity, which is an assessment that in
many ways parallels the contradictory attitudes that Canadians have more
generally about multiculturalism. Compared
to Lord Durham's times, it is now more common to regard multiculturalism, and
less common to regard amalgamation and assimilation, as the solution to the
so-called problem of diversity. Nonetheless,
the meaning and desirability of diversity, assimilation and multiculturalism
still remain very much contested in Canada.
Reviled by some and celebrated by others, few issues can fire Canadians'
passions as the ethnic, cultural and "racial" diversity of the country
and the federal government's policy of multiculturalism.
For many Canadians, our ethnic and "racial" diversity, our
tolerance of difference, and our policy of multiculturalism are the things that
make our country both great and unique.
Our multicultural society is seen as a virtue that makes Canada one of
the most attractive places in the world to live.
Many people, rightly or wrongly, regard multiculturalism as the solution
to problems of racism, intolerance and inequality. For those of us who love to explore the variety of
tastes, cultures and languages that the world has to offer, Canada is the ideal
marketplace. Who else can eat heuvos rancheros for breakfast, perogies for
lunch, and curried goat for supper without leaving our immediate neighbourhoods?
In short, our celebration and promotion of diversity through
multiculturalism is seen by many to be one of the things our society has gotten
right over the years.
But not everyone in Canada shares in this celebration of difference.
Others have demonized multiculturalism and diversity and instead regard
them as the means of our disintegration as a society.
Rather than producing harmony, tolerance and social cohesion, there are
those who see the policy of multiculturalism as producing divisions, hostility
and conflict. Multiculturalism and
"racial" diversity are seen to have led to the creation of new
problems, perhaps far worse than the problems that multiculturalism initially
aimed to address. Multiculturalism,
in its promotion of diversity, is seen by some to undermine traditional Canadian
values; erode the moral fabric of society; promote an untenable social
relativism that leads to an anything goes approach to social life, morality and
law; weaken social cohesion; and fracture society into a post-modern nightmare
of identity politics where everybody demands to be recognized as different at
the expense of our similarities.
In other words, multiculturalism and the diversity which it claims to
celebrate and promote is seen to embody all that is wrong with contemporary
Canada.
The aim of this chapter is to help students think critically about how
multiculturalism is defined as a problem and what it means to say that Canada
has a "race relations" problem. In
the first part of the chapter, we consider the historical backdrop for the
origins of multiculturalism and then analyze recent criticisms of multicultural
policy which suggest that multiculturalism has produced certain problems that
are cause for concern. In the
second part of this chapter, we critically analyze what it means to say that
Canada has, or has the potential to develop, a "race relations"
problem.
Multiculturalism:
A Solution Becomes a Problem
In current political, academic and popular discourse, many terms are
liberally used, often without parsimonious definitions.
The term multiculturalism is no exception.
For the purposes of this chapter, multiculturalism means four
interrelated things. It is a
demographic reality; it is part of pluralist ideology; it is a form of struggle
among groups for access to economic and political resources; and it is a bundle
of government policies and accompanying programmes (Fleras, 1993:
385; Fleras and Elliott, 1996: 325).
In short, multiculturalism can be defined as an ideology, based on
Canadian social reality, that gives rise to sets of economic, political and
social practices, which in turn define boundaries and set limits to ethnic and
"racial" group relations in order to either maintain social order or
manage social change.
Let us examine these dimensions of multiculturalism in more detail.
First, when we say that multiculturalism is a fact in Canadian society,
this means that demographically the Canadian population comprises members from
over one hundred ethnic groups (Fleras and Elliott, 1996: 326).
Canadian society has never been ethnically homogeneous, although it might
have appeared as such because of the dominance of the British and the French[ii].
Canada was certainly a multicultural country long before the implementation of
multiculturalism as policy. Simply
put, up until the introduction of the 1971 policy, Canada, although a
multicultural society in terms of demography, was dominated by the British and
the French in terms of culture, and the Canadian state actively promoted
conformity of the rest of the population to these dominant cultural norms.
Second, as an ideology, multiculturalism includes normative descriptions
about how Canadian society ought to be in terms of social organization based on
ethnicity. The cornerstone of
multiculturalism is the idea of pluralism.
Pluralism, in its cultural interpretation, advocates tolerance of
cultural diversity, and most importantly, promotes the idea that such diversity
is compatible with national goals, especially those of national unity and
socioeconomic progress (Fleras and Elliot. 1996:326). The basic principles of
multiculturalism rest on the notion of cultural relativism.
It prescribes tolerance and exalts diversity to achieve peaceful
coexistence in ethnically heterogeneous societies.
Cultural relativism, as opposed to ethnocentrism, holds that the
evaluative criteria of culture should be drawn from within the culture in
question, and that no external standards are applicable.
We should not judge any culture by our dominant norms.
In short, if we recognize individuals' right to self-identification and
promotion of their own culture, then, it is hoped, the same courtesy would be
extended to individuals who share different cultural norms and values.
Third, multiculturalism is also a process of competition among and
between cultural groups for the acquisition of valuable economic and political
resources. As sociologist Karl
Peter has reminded us, multiculturalism 'is first and foremost a political
program with very defined political aims along with the means to accomplish
these aims" (in Fleras and Elliott, 1996:335).
As such, it is a mechanism for conflict resolution.
It emerged out of social and demographic pressures, and from the
necessity of counterbalancing western alienation and Quebec nationalism, as well
as in order for the Liberals to acquire ethnic electoral support in urban
centers (Fleras and Elliott, 1996:335).
Fourth, multiculturalism as policy is a relatively recent aspect of
Canadian state activity. It was
introduced as a policy of the federal government by Trudeau's Liberals in 1971.
Ironically, it was not the historical legacy of racism, discrimination
and prejudice in Canada that multicultural policy initially aimed to address. In
fact, these issues did not figure much into the framework for the development of
multicultural policy. Instead,
the policy was introduced, in part, as a response to Canada's "other"
ethnic groups (non-English and non-French) who were dissatisfied with the terms
of reference of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism of
1963-69. Groups like
Ukrainian-Canadians were concerned that the federal government had failed to
recognize that they too had made significant contributions to Canadian nation
building. The policy was also
an effort on the part of the Liberals to capture the increasingly large
non-English and non-French vote in this country (Hawkins, 1989:218), and a
strategy on the part of Mr. Trudeau and the federal Liberal Party to undermine
French Canada's claims for equality with English within Canadian confederation
(Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992).
In this context, multiculturalism refers to all government initiatives
and programmes that seek to realize multiculturalism as ideology, and to
transform it into a concrete form of social intervention and organization.
It seeks to accommodate social cleavages, maintain the existing social
order, and manage social change, all in the context of a culturally diverse
society.
Three stages of multicultural policy development have been identified by
Fleras and Elliott (1996). First,
from 1971 to 1980, emphasis was placed on folkloric multiculturalism, or on
"celebrating our differences"; that is, on the idea that cultural
diversity is the heart of Canadian identity.
We no longer had an official culture.
At this time, there were four principles that guided federal
multiculturalism:
1)
the federal government would support all of Canada's cultures and seek to assist
the development of those cultural groups that had demonstrated a desire and
effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada as
well as a clear need for assistance;
2)
the government would assist all
cultural groups to overcome the cultural barriers to full participation in
Canadian society;
3)
the government would promote creative encounters and interchange among all
Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity;
4)
the government would continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of
Canada's two official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian
society (Hawkins, 1989: 220).
In other
words, the years of Anglo-conformity had passed. All cultures were seen as equal.
Culture had become an issue of personal choice, and there was no shortage
in the Canadian ethnic supermarket. In
this light, individuals were protected against any discrimination stemming from
their cultural choices, and were strongly encouraged to cultivate and promote
their cultures, and to fully participate in all aspects of Canadian life.
During the 1980s, the second phase of multicultural policy the process of
institutionalization was developed. This
phase entailed a number of new developments.
First, there emerged an explicit concern over "race relations",
on which we will comment later in this chapter. Second, in 1988 the Progressive
Conservative government passed the Multiculturalism Act, which essentially
turned a de facto policy into a de
jure, legal framework, thus elevating multiculturalism to equality with the
principle of bilingualism. Third,
renewed calls of Quebec nationalism were countered by the repatriation of the
Constitution (1982) and the adaptation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(1985), which were subject to interpretations consistent with the notion of
multiculturalism being a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society.
Finally, multiculturalism was increasingly cast in an economic dimension.
Consistent with neo-conservative economic doctrine was the attempt to
justify the 1988 Multiculturalism Act not only in terms of pluralist ideology,
but also in terms of potential economic benefits to the country.
This involved a shift in emphasis away from a "culture for culture's
sake" perspective towards a more instrumentalist view of the benefits of
multicultural policy. One of the
most explicit signals of this shift was at the Multiculturalism Means Business
Conference held in Toronto in 1986. This conference pointed to the beginning of
a more market-driven approach to multiculturalism.
In his opening address to the conference, Otto Jelinek, the Conservative Minister of State for
Multiculturalism, told the delegates that:
The
competition is fierce; we need every edge we can get and one is knowledge of
foreign languages.... The new mercantilism calls for a new type of corporate
manager, a flexible cosmopolitan aware of cultural sensitivities ..., who can
cut costs and waste by knowing how culture affects behaviour, who can motivate
workers with differing standards, read between the lines of reports from abroad,
and pinpoint the pitfalls of overseas selling, what is or is not acceptable (Jelinek,
1986:5).
He
went on to suggest that :
Simply
expressed, this government believes emphatically that multiculturalism can and
does mean business. Increased business. More business. And from this newly
tapped resource will flow a prosperity which will generate greater social
mobility and open even more doors to opportunity in all avenues of endeavour (Jelinek,
1986:5).
Cultural pluralism, and the image of Canada as an equal, tolerant and
fair society, was therefore defined by the 1980s Conservative government as an
asset within the emerging global economy (Moodley, 1983).
In Ricardian terms, the plethora of cultures and languages of Canadian
society would lead to increased international trade, and improve the comparative
advantage of the country vis-à-vis
our supposedly unilingual and monocultural competitors.
What the Canadian government had failed to recognize is that most
countries in the world are now multicultural in de
facto, if not in policy terms, and so this may not be as much of an
advantage as initially thought.
In the 1990s, a third stage of policy development has arisen.
It is called civic multiculturalism.
This can be defined as a stage during which folkloric and institutional
multiculturalism are coupled with citizenship, that temporarily assumed
institutional expression in the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship,
under Canadian Heritage. The focus
of civic multiculturalism is society-building; fostering a common sense of
identity and belonging is considered essential for the participation and
inclusion of all Canadians into national institutions (see Fleras and Elliott,
1996: 334-335, Table 10.2). It can
be argued that this stage moves away from the folkloric focus and this can be
interpreted as a withdrawal from programmes associated with it (e.g., funding
for cultural festivals).
Like most policy domains, multiculturalism remains very much a contested
terrain. Most people in Canada seem
to recognize the reality that demographically, Canada will be a multicultural
society regardless of whether there is a supporting multicultural policy.
Others, however, pine for a time when we were more homogenous and less
diverse. As such there is little
agreement about the wisdom, desirability or necessity of the federal
government's multicultural policies and programs.
The classic criticisms of the culturalist emphasis within
multiculturalism in the 1970s and early 1980s were that multiculturalism only
promoted those aspects of ethnic cultures which did not challenge Anglo-Saxon
assumptions about the way society should be organized, and that multiculturalism
was an ideology (Roberts and Clifton, 1982; Lewycky, 1992).
Critics suggested that there was too great an emphasis on depoliticized
"song and dance" activities which were non-threatening to British
economic, political and cultural hegemony, and that the policy mystified social
reality by creating the appearance of change without actually changing the
fundamental bases of ethnic and "racial" inequality within Canada (Bolaria
and Li, 1988; Moodley, 1983). Furthermore,
in identifying "cultural barriers" to full participation, it was
argued that this precluded a definition of barriers which acknowledged, let
alone, prioritized racism and discrimination (Bolaria and Li, 1988). In practical terms, many commentators were skeptical of
how an average of $25-30 million per annum, which is the annual budget
allocation for multicultural policy, could possibly address the range of
problems and issues that involved such things as: assistance to cultural groups
in their quest for identifying, preserving and promoting their cultural
identities; cultural interchanges
with other groups; official language(s) acquisition programmes; and removal of
the vaguely-defined cultural barriers to social equality and full participation
in Canadian society. Early criticisms of multiculturalism focused, then, around
the policy's inherent inability to deliver the goods and to solve the problems
which it set out to address.
More recently a number of new criticisms have been leveled against
multicultural policy by a combination of academics, social commentators and
political parties (Fleras and Elliott, 1996: 348, Table 10.3).
The main recent criticisms of multiculturalism are that the policy helps
to reproduce stereotypes of ethnic groups, undermines Canadian unity, ghettoizes
minority issues, takes away from the special claims that francophones and
aboriginal people have within Canadian society, and depoliticizes social
inequality. These are
different from earlier criticisms insofar as the emphasis now is on the negative
social consequences that multicultural policy has produced.
It is implied that the "problem" with multiculturalism is that
it is too successful as a social policy.
A policy which had as one of its underlying intentions the improvement of
intergroup relations is now defined as a policy that leads to deteriorating
intergroup relations and as a threat to the coherence and stability of Canada.
The first criticism of multiculturalism is that it leads to the hardening
of ethnic and "racial" stereotypes.
Novelist Neil Bissoondath, in his 1994 book Selling Illusions: The
Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada, argues that multiculturalism reduces
people to the lowest common denominator. By
reinforcing stereotypes it simplifies and thus devalues culture.
This is a potent argument against folkloric multiculturalism.
"Caravans", "folkfests" and other multicultural
festivals do not promote serious cultural exchanges; instead they are
superficial and have the effect of commodifying, Disneyfying culture.
According to Bissoondath (1994: 83), culture becomes "a thing that
can be displayed, performed, admired, bought, sold, or forgotten".
We have ended up then with no culture but theatre, no history but
fantasy. Multiculturalism therefore
is seen to encourage the devaluation of that which it claims to wish to protect
and promote. Manipulated to social and political utility, culture becomes
folklore (Bissoondath, 1994: 83-84, 88).
For Bissoondath,
Multiculturalism, with all its
festivals and its celebrations, has done, and can do, little to foster a factual
and clear-minded vision of our neighbours. Depending on stereotype, ensuring that the ethnic groups will
preserve their distinctiveness in a gentle and insidious form of cultural
apartheid, multiculturalism has done little more than lead an already divided
country down the path of social divisiveness (Bissoondath, 1994: 89-90).
Moreover,
multiculturalism, by placing individuals into preconceived stereotypes (what
people are, not who they are), diminishes the autonomy and role of the
individual. We have become a nation
of cultural hybrids (Bissoondath, 1994: 224).
We are, as it were, of so many colours, that we are essentially
colourless" (Bissoondath, 1994: 73).
On this point, Bissoondath is probably correct.
There is no evidence to suggest that intercultural exchanges take place
or have indeed assisted in the "harmonization" of racial and ethnic
relations in Canada. Not only have
the "problems" of minority relations not been defined, but the little
intercultural exchanges that do take place are superficial and folkloric at best
(Fleras and Elliott, 1996: 330-331).
The second criticism of multiculturalism is that it promotes cultural
relativism and hence undermines Canadian values and social cohesion.
This criticism has been developed by Reg Bibby, a sociologist at the
University of Lethbridge, and is echoed by Bissoondath, the Reform Party of
Canada and some sections of the Conservative Party of Canada. In Mosaic Madness, Bibby (1990) argues one of the main
social trends of our time is to increasingly value collective and individual
freedom. While freedom is a good in
and of itself, Bibby argues that the consequence of this increasing emphasis on
freedom is to promote individualism, pluralism and relativism.
Individualism, according to Bibby (1990: 1-2), leads to pluralism and
pluralism legitimizes diversity and in turn reinforces the values of both
collective and individual freedom. Relativism, then, is the logical consequence
of freedom, individualism and pluralism. But
what is relativism?
Relativism is defined in terms of the suspension of value judgments about
how people live. He writes:
Truth and best are not listed in the
pluralism dictionary. The only
truth is that everything is relative. "Cultural
relativism" is accepted as a given; those who dare to assert that their
culture is best are dubbed ethnocentric; those who dare to assert that they have
the truth are labelled bigots. Truth has been replaced by personal viewpoint (Bibby, 1990:
2).
Mosaic Madness suggests that pluralism does emancipate individuals
and groups. Contrary to absolutist views about truth, which transcend
cultures and individuals, cultural relativism argues that the truth is socially
constructed and it thus "erases agreement on the norms that are essential
to social life" (Bibby, 1990:14). Cultural
relativism, which is seen to be promoted by multicultural policy,
leads to the undermining of social cohesion. We have enshrined into law
our "good intentions" of bilingualism, multiculturalism and
anti-racism by institutionalizing appropriate policies.
But in consequence, we have become a fractious nation that lacks a sense
of community (Bibby, 1990: 15). Canada,
in attempting to promote (peaceful) coexistence is indeed promoting the
breakdown of group life.
Bibby moreover argues that individual freedom coupled with pluralism
leads to the construction of "mosaics within mosaics" (individuals and
smaller groups within groups (Bibby, 1990: 7-8).
This, Bibby claims, is "too much of a good thing". Excessive individualism stresses individual rights over
social rules. There is no
"team spirit", no social spirit.
We confuse choice with "the best" (Bibby, 1990: 98),
and we give everything an "A" (Bibby, 1990: 176).
Indeed we are abandoning the "pursuit of the best" and slowly
slipping into a state of multicultural mediocrity.
Bibby does not suggest what is "the best", who deserves an
"A", or who should decide these issues and how.
So, according to Bibby, Canadian society has changed as a result of
multiculturalism, but not in entirely positive ways.
There appears to be a reversal of emphasis: whereas up until the 1950s
Canadians had placed emphasis on community, on the collectivity, since then, we
have been emphasizing the individual. Pluralism,
although imperative for coexistence, does not offer a subsequent vision of the
country, does not set national goals, and does not have a cause.
We have, according to Bibby (1990: 103-104), ended up with a value system
that contains nothing exclusively Canadian.
Bissoondath (1994: 71), in a similar vein, argues that multiculturalism
has failed because it has eradicated the centre: "it has diminished all
sense of Canadian values, of what is a Canadian".
Most importantly, multiculturalism does not include an ultimate vision of
the kind of society it wishes to create (Bissoondath, 1994:42).
It is vague. Although
Bissoondath does not advocate a return to the years of Anglo-conformity, he
argues that multiculturalism does not offer a vision of unity and it encourages
division by ghettoizing people into ethnic groups. It has imposed social controls and employs divide and conquer
strategy and tactics. It is a
myopic view of the present that ignores the future (Bissoondath, 1994:
44).
The
Reform Party of Canada has called repeatedly for the abolition of multicultural
programmes and the Multicultural Department as a whole on the same kinds of
grounds expressed by both Bibby and Bissoondath.
According to Reform, cultural preservation is a matter of private choice
and the state has no place in promoting diversity.
Instead, the government should be preserving and promoting our national
culture and should encourage ethnic cultures to integrate into it (Reform Party
of Canada in Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992: 373).
Similarly, in Bissoondath's (1994: 219) terms, public policy has no place
in personal culture and ethnicity. Is
has to be returned to individuals, who do not need to be defined culturally by
Ottawa bureaucrats. Our ultimate goal should be a cohesive, effective society
with cultural diversity. If our aim
is reasonable diversity within rigorous unity we must diminish the former to
achieve the latter (Bissoondath, 1994: 224).
Influenced by the relative electoral appeal of Reform, the Progressive
Conservative Party passed a number of resolutions at its 1991 annual convention
that pointed clearly to a more right-wing shift in their immigration and
multicultural policies. With respect to multiculturalism, it was resolved that
they should abandon the policy of multiculturalism and its Department all
together, and should instead "try to foster a common national identity for
the people living together in harmony as equal citizens, loyal to the Canadian
ideal" (PC Party of Canada in Abu- Laban and Stasiulis, 1992: 374).
When this resolution was passed, the governing Conservatives were in an
awkward position having to defend a policy that their membership no longer
supported. Gerry Weiner, the then
Minister of State for Multiculturalism, defended the policy and argued that the
convention's resolutions did not represent the majority of party members, since
there was not enough representation of ethnic and "racial" minorities
in the body of delegates. This
justification is an indirect admission that the PCs did not have an ethnic base,
and that those in government were trying hard to break into the ethnic vote.
It is also interesting that no one mentioned the lack of ethnic
representation with respect to other resolutions, not related to
multiculturalism (e.g., on the economy or on social programmes).
What is common
in all criticisms of this type is an appeal to the "national"
character of Canada, which is never defined.
The implication is that the current system is biased in favour of
"non-whites" and "non-Europeans" and it should not be.
In addition, people expressing the above views are always silent or
purposefully vague in describing what constitutes Canadian culture (most of the
time they mean Anglo-tradition), the definition of what is Canadian, or what are
Canadian values. It is
unclear what exactly ethnic subcultures or countercultures are to be integrated
into. Notice that there is no
definition of what constitutes "the best" or whose community it is,
who defines it, whose interests it serves and so on.
Moreover, it is not at all the case that pluralism inevitably leads to
relativism. It is not certain that
multiculturalism encourages an "everything goes" mentality, nor that
it fudges the lines between what is acceptable and what is not.
According to Fleras and Elliot (1996: 354) multiculturalism does operate
within limits; it "rejects any customs that violate Canadian laws,
interfere with the rights of others, offends the moral sensibilities of most
Canadians, or disturbs central institutions or core values". For example,
female circumcision is a cultural practice in parts of Africa and Asia, and
presumably part of the cultural heritage of some Canadians.
In May, 1997, though, an amendment to the Criminal Code of Canada came
into force which outlawed female genital mutilation precisely because that
practice violates the human rights of young women and offends notions of
equality, human integrity and other core values prevalent in Canada.[iii]
The third criticism is that multiculturalism promotes the ghettoization
of ethnic issues. Ironically, it
has been within the ranks of the federal Liberal Party that this criticism was
most forcefully developed. The
Liberals have historically been the party that has most identified with
multiculturalism. It developed the
non-discriminatory immigration policy, as well as the official policy of
multiculturalism. It has also been
the party most rewarded by the ethnic vote.
It, too, however, harbours people who are opposed to the policy of
multiculturalism. As Abu-Laban and
Stasiulis write (1992: 375), a number of "ethnic" MPs were critical of
multiculturalism's ghettoizing effects in the early 1990s.
John Nunziata, then a Liberal MP, was the most vocal opponent of the
policy, arguing that it no longer serves a constructive purpose in Canadian
society. When he ran and won as an
independent in the 1997 federal election, a number of his supporters raised the
issue of the Liberal grip of the Italian community in Canada, vowing to put an
end to it.
One of Nunziata's criticisms is of particular interest: the case of
internment and confiscation of property of Japanese-Canadians during the war was
handled by the Ministry of Multiculturalism, not by the Ministry of Justice. These were justice issues, he argued, not ethnic ones (Abu-Laban
and Stasiulis, 1992: 376). Subsequently,
the Liberal Party in its 1992 convention, after re-affirming its support for
multiculturalism, has proceeded with the incorporation of some these criticisms
into its platform. Specifically, it
has been recognized that multiculturalism may indeed have ghettoizing effects,
and that a single cultural policy may be a more appropriate course of action,
accompanied by a single Department of Culture and Communications. This was a clear shift towards society-building, civic
multiculturalism which involved facilitating the inclusion and participation of
all citizens (by pursuing anti-racist policies) and by promoting
"citizenship" (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992: 376).
When the Liberals assumed power in 1993, they established the Ministry of
Canadian Heritage, and Multiculturalism was once again relegated to a branch of
a larger federal department.
The fourth
criticism is that multiculturalism undermines the special claims that
francophones and aboriginal peoples have in Canadian society.
As noted above, the inception of multicultural policy had an ulterior
motive, namely the undermining of the legitimacy of Quebec nationalism by
reducing the Quebec factor to an ethnic phenomenon (Bissoondath, 1994: 40, 62).
Initially, multiculturalism was seen as an attempt by the
Federal government to undermine the legitimate Quebec aspirations for
"nationhood". "By
severing culture from language, multiculturalism policy rejected the 'two
nations' thesis about Canada's development, and reduced the status of French
Canadians and/or the Quebecois from that of 'founding people' to the same rank
as the 'other ethnic groups'" (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992: 367).
This interpretation of multiculturalism was of course shared by Rene
Levesque and by many Quebec academics (see Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992:
367-368). Rene Levesque, for
example, was dismissive of multiculturalism from the beginning, because it
obscured the Quebec issue (Bissoondath, 1994: 40). As Dufour argued in Le
Defi quebecois, multiculturalism was a mechanism to buy allophone votes and
to reduce the Quebec factor to an ethnic phenomenon.
Harvey (1985, cited in Abu Laban and Stasiulis, 1992) and Labelle (1990,
cited in Abu Laban and Stasiulis, 1992) argue that multiculturalism has an
adverse effect on the Quebec collectivity by minoritizing it (similar to the
process of "racialization" (Bissoondath, 1994:40).
Assimilationist Quebec policies towards allophones can be understood in
this context. The Quebec government of the late 1970s, early 1980s pursued
a policy of "interculturalism" instead, which recognized cultural
diversity within Quebec, but did not reduce the "national question" in
Quebec to an ethnic phenomenon; it discouraged ethnic enclaves and promoted
linguistic assimilation (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992: 368).
Aboriginal people and organizations have expressed similar criticisms and
have similar reservations about multiculturalism.
They argue that multiculturalism reduces them to "just another
minority" and undermines their aspirations for self-government (Abu-Laban
and Stasiulis, 1992:376). They
claim that they possess a distinct and unique set of rights that stem from their
being the first occupants of the land in Canada.
Since aboriginal people do not consider themselves to be part of a
pluralist society, but as being distinct people, multiculturalism is seen as an
actual threat to their survival. They
prefer to negotiate their future in a bi-national framework (as the Quebecois)
that recognizes their collective rights to special status and distinctiveness (Fleras
and Elliott, 1996:343).
Finally, a valuable critique comes from the political economy
perspective. Stasiulis (1980:34) for example, argues that, in line with the
state's role in legitimizing the existing social order, its interventions
(multiculturalism, bilingualism) have a depoliticizing effect. By
overemphasizing "cultural" and linguistic barriers to equality they
conceal other, perhaps more fundamental social inequalities based on people's
property rights, position in the labour market, education, gender and age.
In fact, Canadian society is characterized by a clear ethnically (and
gender)-based class hierarchy and struggle, which of course is not addressed by
multiculturalism, because such struggle is challenging, if not threatening, the
existing social order. Multiculturalism
obfuscates these antagonisms and shifts the struggle to the "cultural"
realm.
We could, for example, analyze the state policy of multiculturalism in
terms of the class struggle and the hegemonic position of capitalists in
Canadian society. Class hegemony,
writes Stasiulis (1980:34-37), referring to Laclau, is not (only) the ability of
the dominant groups to impose their "world view" on subordinate ones,
but rather the state's ability to articulate, project, and often impose on
people different conceptions of social reality
in a way that neutralize their potential antagonisms.
Multiculturalism is a case in point.
Instead of portraying Canadian society as divided among antagonistic
class and gender lines, it paints a picture of society as a "community of
communities" in which the most important, or the only, cleavages are
cultural and/or linguistic. So, if
we learn to "live with each other", everything will be fine.
In addition, the state, by funding specific activities of ethnic
organizations or appointing community leaders, regulates the actions of ethnic
communities and keeps them in line (Ng, 1988).
And finally, in relation to the issue of the threat to Canadian unity
supposedly posed by multiculturalism, political economists point out that a far
bigger threat to Canadian unity and cohesion comes from the North American Free
Trade Agreement and our associated political, economic and cultural
incorporation into the United States. Canadian
culture has indeed changed over the years, but the biggest reason for these
changes is not so much the arrival of new immigrants and the existence of the
policy of multiculturalism, but rather because of the economic and cultural pull
of our neighbour to the south.
Race
and Multiculturalism
In the 1970s and early 1980's it looked as if the concept of
"race" had been allocated to the proverbial dustbin of history. For the first decade of its official existence, the language
within the multicultural policy field was reflective of a discourse of culture,
and multiculturalism programs were aimed primarily at cultural enhancement and
enrichment, and assisting groups "to overcome the cultural barriers to full
participation in Canadian society" (Hawkins, 1989:220).
Other government policies and programs such as the 1986 Employment Equity
Act, the 1986 Federal Contractors program, the 1986 Public Service Employment
Equity Program, the 1988 Multiculturalism Act, and the 1993 Public Service
Reform Act, spoke euphemistically about "visible minorities" rather
than "race" (Synnott and Howes, 1996).
As we pointed out earlier, the federal government has begun to rethink
the cultural emphasis within the multicultural policy field (Kobayashi, 1992).
While an emphasis on cultural retention remains, there is a renewed emphasis on
improving race relations. In
addition, racism and discrimination have been added to "cultural
barriers" as obstacles to "full participation" in Canadian
society.
One of the first indications of the shift away from the view that
"cultural barriers" were "the problem", and a corresponding
move towards a "race relations" definition, occurred in 1981 when the
Department of the Secretary of State (the institutional home of the
Multiculturalism Directorate at the time) commissioned a series of situation
reports on "race relations" in twelve cities in Canada.
The stated objective for these reports was to collect information on the
current state of "race relations" in those cities.
Generally, these reports demonstrated that while specific circumstances
varied in each city, there was the perception that "race relations"
were problematic, or that they had the potential to become problematic (Lewycky,
1985; Lewycky, 1989:245; see also Malik, 1982; Lowe, 1982; Mensah, 1982; Jobidon,
1982).
Since then the language of "race" and "race
relations" has become embedded in the discourses, policies and
institutional structures of the federal government.
In its 1987 package of recommendations regarding Multicultural policy to
the House of Commons, the Standing Committee on Multiculturalism suggested that:
The
desire for harmonious race relations is paramount for all Canadians.
As Canada becomes increasingly multiracial,
race relations
policies must be an integral component of any Canadian multiculturalism
policy.... The Multiculturalism Minister and Department have a lead
responsibility for the advocacy of harmonious race
relations ... (Standing Committee on Multiculturalism, 1987:50, our
emphasis).
Seemingly acting on the basis of at least some of the recommendations of
the Standing Committee, section 3(1)(a) of the Multiculturalism Act, passed by
the House of Commons in 1988, declared that it was the policy of the government
to
recognize
and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of
Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society
to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage (cited in
Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, 1992:3, our emphasis).
"Race relations" now also has an institutional legitimacy in
that the Multiculturalism and Citizenship Secretariat contains a "Race
Relations and Cross-Cultural Understanding Program" (Multiculturalism and
Citizenship Canada, 1992:3). Part
of the mandate of this program is to "foster the elimination of racism and
racial discrimination, to assist Canadian institutions in becoming responsive
and adapting to Canada's multicultural reality and to promote cross-cultural
understanding and the principles of equality of access".
The institutionalization of "race relations" was also part of
the federal government's original package of redress to Japanese Canadians for
their treatment during the Second World War. Bill C-63, introduced in 1989, proposed to establish the
Canadian Race Relations Foundation. The
Bill proposed, in part, to establish a foundation whose role would be to serve
as a clearing house for information related to the elimination of racism and
discrimination, and to advocate for the improvement of "race
relations" in Canada (Kobayashi, 1992).
The concern over racism and discrimination is also reflected in federal
Employment Equity legislation introduced in 1986.
The aim of the legislation is to improve the employment opportunities of
women, "visible minorities", Aboriginal people and the disabled. This
legislation seeks to correct the "systemic discrimination" that exists
in the workplace by forcing federally regulated employers and federal
contractors to develop employment equity plans and reports which outline the
positive measures they intend to undertake to improve the employment
opportunities for the four target groups. It
is also reflected in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
"Race"
and "Race Relations": Conceptual and Political Muddles
The changes within the multicultural policy field, which in part involve
a shift in focus towards improving "race relations" and battling
racism and discrimination, and which appear to be progressive changes, have
tended to undercut previous criticisms that multiculturalism only promoted
symbolic ethnicity, that it was simply an ideology which mystified social
reality, and that it did not pay enough attention to racism and discrimination.
Indeed, Stasiulis (1989) argues that these changes in general, and the
inclusion of visible minorities as a target group within Employment Equity
legislation in particular, represent a "significant philosophical break
from Canadian political tradition" (Stasiulis, 1989:233-34). We suggest that the present discourse of "race" and
"race relations" within the government, and by academics, continues to
reflect old and racialized assumptions about the definition of the problem.
There are four sets of issues which we will address.
First, the new discourses and policies within the multicultural field
reflect a reified conception of "race". The reification of
"race" involves the elevation of a concept to the status of a thing.
As noted at various conferences organized by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to examine the
"race" concept (Montagu, 1972), as well as by a more recent generation
of scholars from a number of academic disciplines in a variety of countries
(Goldberg, 1990; Miles, 1982; Ujimoto, 1990; Kobayashi, 1992), "race"
is not a biological reality but rather a social construct which has been used to
describe and explain certain patterns of physical and genetic variation.
In other words, while physical and genetic differences amongst people do
in fact exist, "races" of people do not exist in any biological sense.
Accordingly, "race" should be seen as a label that has been
used to describe and (incorrectly) explain those differences (Miles, 1982).
Clearly, as noted by Miles (1982) and others the use of the language of
"race" and "race relations" involves the reproduction of the
scientifically mistaken belief that "races" of people exist and that
they have social relations with each other.
The concept of "race" is attributed with a real ontological
status, and has a determinant impact on the position and experiences of
particular groups of people.
State discourses and policies are laced with this reification. To
reiterate only a few selected examples already noted in this chapter, the
situation reports on race relations,
the Race Relations Foundation
Bill (our emphasis), and the recommendations of the Standing Committee on
Multiculturalism all make use of a reified conception of "race" to the
extent that they clearly suggest that "races" of people exist and that
there is a category of social relationship that can be called "race
relations". Moreover, the
federal government's operationalization of the concept of visible minorities is
based on a confusing and sometimes contradictory mix of "racial" and
national criteria of human difference. According
to the government, "visible minorities" are people who are
"non-white in colour, or non-Caucasian in race, other than Aboriginal
people" and specifically include ten groups: "Blacks, Chinese,
Filipino, other Pacific Islanders, Indo-Pakistani, Japanese, Korean, Southeast
Asian, West Asian and Arab, and Latin Americans" (Synnott and Howes,
1996:137).
The conceptual problem of the reification of "race" is,
unfortunately, shared by many academics who are interested in, and concerned
about, the future of "race relations" in Canada.
In his effort to develop a model of "race" and ethnic relations
in Canada, Driedger (1989:365) argues that
non-Caucasian
racial and visible
minorities ... represent modified pluralism, because most of these Black,
Chinese, Japanese and East Indian visible minorities would like to integrate
into Canadian society but because of their race,
are often prevented from doing so entirely.
In
Driedger's formulation, "race" is a real, objective attribute that
people possess, which in turn has a determinant impact on how they are treated,
their position in Canadian society, and on inter-group relations.
Ironically, the reproduction of scientifically mistaken notions of
"race" also occurs within the work of those who explicitly recognize
that "race" is a socially created category (Bolaria and Li, 1988).
While Stasiulis (1990) recognizes that "race" is a socially
constructed label formed in particular historical contexts for particular sets
of political and economic reasons, she also continues to use the term
"race" as if it refers to real groups of people. For instance, in her
critique of affirmative action programs she argues that "as a strategy to
redress inequities in the employment of racial
and ethnic minorities, however, affirmative action, even if pursued
aggressively and backed with a high degree of political will, legal provisions
for enforcement and resources, is bound to be ineffectual" (1989:238, our
emphasis).
Stasiulis justifies the continued use of the terms "race" and
"race relations" on the grounds that "race, like gender, has
biological referents and is most commonly associated with physiognomically based
difference such as skin colour" (Stasiulis, 1990:295).
But this justification simply reinforces the idea that "races"
are real, biologically-defined categories.
Thus, whereas the distinction between "sex" and
"gender" (where the former refers to biological and the latter to
socially defined differences between people) has now become common currency
amongst academics and policy makers, no similar formal recognition is given to
the distinction between differences in skin colour and the socially defined
differences that are associated with skin colour: differences in skin colour are
simply seen to be evidence for the existence of different "races" of
people.
The problem with the reification of "race" is that it
reinforces common sense usage of a term which has been scientifically
discredited. By continuing to use
terms which lack a clear scientific basis, the state and academic discourses
around "race relations" reinforce the idea that "races" of
people exist and that they have social relations with one another. While not
inherently racist, the continued uncritical use of the language of
"race" and "race relations" helps to sustain a wider
racialization of the world, a process whereby social significance is attached to
patterns of physical and/or genetic variation (Miles, 1989).
Second, the interest in racism and discrimination for successive federal
governments since the early 1980s appears to be motivated, in large part, by a
concern over competition. Racism
and discrimination became defined as problems in the 1980s, not because of the
harm and distress that they cause individuals who are subjects of harassment and
unequal treatment, but rather because those types of actions are seen to involve
the inefficient use of human resources. Formed
under the Liberals, the terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Equality
in Employment clearly reflected this rationale when it stated that "the
Government of Canada recognizes that it has an obligation to provide leadership
in ensuring the equitable and rational management of human resources within its
organizations" (Abella, 1984).
In this context, even though racism and discrimination are now defined as
part of the problem that "visible minorities" face in Canada, the
assumption within government policy is that racism and discrimination are
irrational features of an otherwise rational, peaceful, harmonious and
meritocratic society. The focus on
"racially"-based barriers to mobility, the language used do describe
even the problem of racism, tends to reinforce the idea that we live in an
otherwise meritocratic society in which rewards are normally based on talent and
achievements. This view tends to
obfuscate the social meaning and significance of racism and racialization, and
the ways in which physical differences have been, and are, used by state
officials and others to place certain groups of people with certain sets of
physical characteristics into particular kinds of jobs (Satzewich, 1991).
The Canadian media is also at fault here, particularly for its coverage
of the issue of racism during the 1993 and 1997 federal election campaigns.
By focusing on the Reform Party's attractiveness to the "redneck
racists", particularly in small
town and rural western Canada, it tended to portray the problem of racism as
confined to an unenlightened, poorly educated segments of the population.
Little discussion was centered around systemic racism and discrimination
faced by groups in the presumably more enlightened and cosmopolitan cities in
eastern Canada.
The third difficulty with the continued uncritical use of the language of
"race" and "race relations" is that it tends to preclude
alternative definitions of "the problem". The "race relations" problematic, tends to rule out
the possibility that factors like class-place and gender affect the social
positions and experiences of groups of people who possess particular
phenotypical characteristics. This
has the effect of undermining the potential for political and economic alliances
between people who share similar social circumstances.
A related dimension to this problem is that the language of "race
relations" and "visible minorities" also tends to homogenize
those groups that are "racially" defined.
Synnott and Howes (1996: 144)) argue that "Canada does not have a
dichotomous racial stratification system with all Whites above, and all
non-Whites, now recorded as visible minorities, below".
There is, for example, a substantial weight of evidence in Canada to
suggest that immigrant women, particularly those from southern Europe, Asia and
the Caribbean, face very different labour market conditions from their male
counterparts. They have different labour market experiences and face structural
barriers to advancement based on class and gender in addition to a process of
racialization (Boyd, 1992; Arnopoulos, 1979; Seward, 1990; Estable, 1986; Ng and
Estable, 1987). In many
cases, these barriers are reinforced and perpetuated by immigration policies
which restrict the ability of those who enter the country as
"dependents" (who are mainly women) to enter state-funded language and
skills upgrading programs offered by the Canada Employment and Immigration
Commission. Defined as
"dependents" who are not necessarily destined to the labour force,
these practices serve to allocate, and then confine, immigrant women from these
areas in jobs which Canadian-born men and women are reluctant to fill because of
poor pay and poor working conditions (Boyd, 1990).
By its focus on "racially-based" barriers to advancement, the
discourse of multiculturalism thus tends to over-simplify, and obscure, the
multiple disadvantages faced by certain groups of immigrant, and aboriginal,
women.
Fourth, the tendency within the new "race relations" discourse
is to assume that source of the problems of racism and poor "race
relations" are matters of demography and numbers.
That is, the growth of racism, and the concomitant deterioration in
domestic "race relations" is equated with increases in the relative
size of so-called "non-White races".
In a report published by the Saskatchewan provincial government in 1978
entitled "The Explosive Years": Indian and Metis Issues in
Saskatchewan to 2001 it was noted that
The
most important demographic trend in Saskatchewan for the next 25 years is the
growth in the Indian ancestry population both in absolute terms and also as a
proportion of the total population ... Given the present attitudes and policy
orientations of non-Indians and judging from past experience in
Indian/non-Indian relationships, the next 25 years could be years of racial
turmoil in Saskatchewan. If racial
turmoil does begin in Canada, it is likely to begin in Saskatchewan and spread
to other areas (Svenson, 1978:1).
Thus, the report saw the main reason for the potential deterioration in
"race relations" in Saskatchewan in demographic terms. This report, along with other predictions about the potential
for deteriorating "race relations" in the prairie provinces, all raise
the spectre of the growth in the relative and absolute size of the Aboriginal
population. According to a report
prepared in 1983 for the federal Department of the Secretary of State (Cohen,
1983), Aboriginal youth are expected to provide much of the growth in the labour
force in the future; indeed, according
to Cohen (1983:28-29), "currently one out of four school children are of
native ancestry. These children
represent 25 percent of the potential labour force in the next decade".
The implication is that the growth in size of Aboriginal entrants to the
labour force will lead to "problems" if that population is not
incorporated into the job market. In
other words, the message is that increases in the size of the Aboriginal
ancestry population is naturally problem creating.
In Canada more generally, the issues of deteriorating "race
relations" and increases in racism are also linked with the growth in the
size of immigration flows from Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America.
The view that "race relations" have the potential to
deteriorate because of increases in the size of certain populations is widely
reproduced by academics, government officials and members of the Reform Party. While the Reform Party has distanced itself from more extreme
versions of this equation, its politically sanitized version simply calls for
across the board reductions in immigration flows to Canada.
This opposition to immigration, while not couched in terms of
"race", is really a thin veil for
their belief that Canada is being swamped with "non-whites" and that
the "character" of Canadian society is changing too rapidly.
The equation here is rather simple: immigrants and aboriginal people who
do not possess white skin create diversity, and this diversity creates problems
which need to be managed through state intervention.
We certainly do not deny the existence of the unconscionably high rates
of unemployment faced by Aboriginal youth, nor do we deny that there has been a
growth in the size of immigration flows from outside of Europe.
However, we do want to raise two issues relating to the framing of the
"race relations" problem in terms of demographics and population size.
First, this view tends to display a certain sense of historical amnesia.
It implies that the problem of racism is of relatively recent origin.
By equating racism with increasing immigration, the implication is that
until recently, when the size of the "non-white population" was
relatively small, different "races" in Canada have lived together in
peace, harmony and good will. However,
as noted in more detail by others (Bolaria and Li, 1988; Ng,1989, Anderson,
1991), Canadian society was formed on the basis of a gendered racialization of
different groups of people. While
it is true that in the early years of this century immigrants were subject to a
racialized hierarchy of desirability which became more rigid when populations of
particular origins increased in size relative to the population of British
origin (see Woodsworth, 1972), it is also the case that groups whose population
in Canada was quite small were subject to various forms of racism and
exclusionary practices. In the
early 1900s, there were no more than six thousand immigrants from India who were
resident in the country. Those
immigrants were only a fraction of the total population of the Canada yet they
were subject to virulent racism, physical attacks and eventual exclusionary
immigration practices. Furthermore,
Aboriginal people were subject to intense forms of racism and discrimination
when their population was relatively small and in fact declining
relative to the larger European population.
Thus, historically the problem of racism and "race relations"
have not necessarily been correlated with how many, or how few, of a particular
group of people there are in the country (see Bolaria and Li, 1988).
Second, the equation of the potential deterioration in "race
relations" with the growth in size of non-European groups in the country
reinforces the belief that it is these groups themselves who create problems
simply by virtue of their presence. This
equation of "immigration" and poor "race relations" was a
central feature of the racialization of British politics in the 1970s.
In that context, immigrants from the New Commonwealth countries in
Caribbean and the Asian sub-continent were defined as racially distinct from the
English "race", and the increase in size of the former was identified
as the direct cause of social problems in many British cities.
For many, the natural solution to the "problem" was to restrict
the ability of individuals from the New Commonwealth to immigrate to Britain;
for others, the solution was posed in terms of repatriation (Miles and Solomos,
1987).
In Great Britain, as is the case in Canada, this assumes that "the
problem" would be less acute if there were fewer of "them" and
that conversely, the more of "them" there are the more problems they
create for the rest of the country. This
is an implicitly racist discourse because this reinforces the identification of
the problem not so much in terms of the nature of the reaction to their
presence, which is oftentimes characterized by racism and hostility; but
instead, the source of the problem is shifted, as with the earlier multicultural
discourse to the simple presence of more immigrants and aboriginal people and
their own "novel" characteristics which create barriers to their
mobility. By focusing on the issue
of numbers, the discourse subtly shifts attention away from the issue of racism
and places more attention onto new immigrants and Aboriginal people.
Strictly speaking, the presence of these groups is not the problem, the
reaction to their presence is.
This, incidentally, is also the difficulty with the discourse of
tolerance which is also beginning to pervade the multicultural policy field.
Part of the language of contemporary "race relations" used both
by academics and state officials in Canada is the promotion of tolerance. What
is needed in order to improve "race relations", according to many, is
for Canadians to learn to be more tolerant.
Despite what are likely to be good intentions, the discourse of tolerance
is potentially racist to the extent that it reinforces the notion that certain
groups are problem creating. According
to the Oxford English Dictionary, "tolerance", is defined as the
ability to endure. Generally, we do
not endure "good" behavior; we endure, or put up with, bad or
problematic behaviour. Thus, this
discourse of tolerance, like the demographic discourse, reinforces the idea that
it is immigrants and Aboriginal people who create problems.
Put simply, they are doing nasty things of which we need to be tolerant.
Arguably, what Canadians need to do is be more intolerant:
intolerant of racism and intolerant
of discrimination.
Conclusion